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Abstract 
Financial incentive interventions are increasingly used as a method of encouraging healthy 
behaviours, from attending for vaccinations to taking part in regular physical activity. There is a 
growing body of research on the effectiveness of financial incentive interventions for health 
behaviours. Wide variations in the nature of these interventions make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about what makes an effective incentive, for whom and under what circumstances. 
Whilst there has been some recognition of the theoretical complexity of financial incentive 
interventions for health behaviours, there is no framework that categorises these interventions. This 
limits the research community’s ability to clearly establish which components of financial incentives 
interventions are more and less effective, and how these components might interact to enable 
behavioural change. We propose a framework for describing health promoting financial incentive 
interventions. Drawing on our experience of a recently completed systematic review, we identify 
nine domains that are required to describe any financial incentive intervention designed to help 
individuals change their health behaviours. These are: direction, form, magnitude, certainty, target, 
frequency, immediacy, schedule and recipient. Our framework should help researchers and policy 
makers identify the most effective incentive configurations for helping individuals adopt healthy 
behaviours. 
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Carrots, sticks, and health behaviours: a framework for documenting the complexity of financial 
incentive interventions to change individual health behaviours 
‘Carrot’ and ‘stick’ financial incentive interventions are increasingly being used to encourage healthy 
behaviours. Pregnant smokers in Scotland are offered grocery vouchers if they provide smoke-free 
breath tests at weekly check-ups (Ballard & Radley, 2009). Australian families are eligible for 
additional social security benefits if their children are up-to-date with all their vaccinations 
(Lawrence, MacIntyre, Hull, & McIntyre, 2004). Obese English adults can earn monthly cash rewards 
for achieving pre-specified weight loss goals (Relton, Strong, & Li, 2011). Voucher based contingency 
management, where clients receive vouchers exchangeable for a range of goods and services 
contingent on achievement of therapeutic goals (Lussier, Heil, Mongeon, Badger, & Higgins, 2006; 
Prendergast, Podus, Finney, Greenwell, & Roll, 2006), is recommended by the UK National Institute 
of Health and Care Excellence to reduce illicit drug use and promote drug users’ engagement with 
services (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2007). Online, www.stickK.com gives 
users the facility to set up and monitor commitment contracts that allow users to pledge to achieve 
any behavioural goals they choose, alongside making a cash deposit that is forfeited in the event of 
failure (S. Halpern, Asch, & Volpp, 2012). These examples demonstrate the variety and complexity of 
financial incentive interventions. 
There is a growing body of research on the effectiveness of financial incentive interventions 
for helping individuals to change their health behaviours (e.g. Cahill & Perera, 2011; Lagarde, Haines, 
& Palmer, 2007; Lussier et al., 2006; O' Malley, Baker, Francis, Perry, & Foster, 2012; Paul-
Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008; Prendergast et al., 2006; Wall, Ni Mhurchu, Blakely, Rodgers, & 
Wilton, 2006). But wide variations in the nature of these interventions make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about what makes an effective incentive, for whom and under what circumstances.  
It is not necessarily always clear exactly what a financial incentive intervention is, and is not. 
The key components of incentive interventions identified in the behaviour change literature are that 
Framework for financial incentives interventions 
4 
 
they are rewarding and that they are contingent on behaviour change (Abraham & Michie, 2008). 
However, this leaves unclear what exactly a ‘financial reward’ is. Grocery vouchers certainly have 
financial value, but they are not directly monetary. Nor is entry into a Quit & Win competition 
necessarily a reward if an individual does not win one of the prizes offered, despite having quit 
smoking. Commitment contracts are only rewarding in that they involve avoidance of penalties, 
rather than clear positive rewards. 
It is, therefore, challenging to capture the complexity of financial incentive interventions in a 
simple definition. Recently there has been some recognition of the theoretical complexity of 
financial incentive interventions for health behaviours (Johnston & Sniehotta, 2010). For example, 
Johnston & Sniehotta (2010) highlighted the range of behavioural change techniques that might be 
involved in a financial incentive intervention – from agreeing a contract, through goal setting, 
behaviour monitoring, feedback, to eventual reward. Such interventions draw on a range of 
behaviour change theories, including Self-Regulation Theory (Bandura, 1986), Operant Conditioning 
(Skinner, 1953), Contingency Management theories (Petry, 2011) and learning theories. Although 
some attempts have been made to list important design aspects of financial incentive interventions 
(Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher, & Bonevski, 2013), we are not aware of any  framework that has been 
proposed to capture, systematically, the complexity of the nature of financial incentive interventions 
and provide standard terminology to help achieve this. Such a framework would help authors and 
readers describe and compare the detailed nature of financial incentive interventions, and highlight 
the complexity of such interventions to policy makers and those designing new interventions. The 
absence of such a framework limits the research community’s ability to clearly establish which 
components of financial incentives interventions are more and less effective, and how these 
components might interact to enable behavioural change (Michie & Johnston, 2012).  
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A framework of financial incentive interventions for health behaviour change 
We propose a framework for describing health promoting financial incentive interventions. Drawing 
on our experience of an on-going systematic review in this area (J. Adams, Giles, Robalino, McColl, & 
Sniehotta, 2012), we identify nine domains that are required to fully describe any financial incentive 
intervention designed to help individuals change their health behaviours. We offer dimensions, with 
examples, for each domain in Table 1, and the domains are described in more detail below.  
Direction. The ‘direction’ domain specifies whether the reward component of an incentive 
intervention is a positive gain associated with engaging in a healthy behaviour, or the avoidance of a 
negative loss that might be imposed for not engaging in the behaviour. This allows ‘stick’ incentive 
interventions, such as those popularised by www.stickK.com, to be considered alongside more 
common ‘carrot’ incentives. It is worth noting that even if participants adhere to commitment 
contracts and retain their investment, there is an opportunity cost associated with any investment 
and this may limit the value individuals place on such commitment contract ‘rewards’. 
Form. ‘Form’ describes the nature of the incentive – i.e. cash, vouchers exchangeable for a 
range of goods or services, or vouchers exchangeable for only one specific good. Some concern has 
been expressed  that it is unacceptable to reward financially costly behaviours such as smoking 
cessation with cash that can then be spent on exactly the behaviour it was designed to discourage 
(Bonevski, Bryant, & Paul, 2011).1 Vouchers for a restricted range of products, or only one product, 
avoid this risk. The attractiveness of different incentives is also likely to vary between individuals and 
this may moderate the effects of incentives. For example, cash incentives might be more valued by, 
and hence more effective in, individuals with lower disposable incomes (Paul-Ebhohimhen & 
Avenell, 2008).  
                                                          
1 This is only one aspect of the ethics and acceptability of financial incentive interventions that has been 
questioned. Fuller discussion of the ethics and acceptability of financial incentive interventions are available 
elsewhere.(S. D. Halpern, Madison, & Volpp, 2009; Marteau, Ashcroft, & Oliver, 2009) 
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Magnitude. This domain describes the total value of incentive available to participants in the 
programme. We conceptualise this as a continuous, rather than categorical, variable and do not 
make any attempt to define what is a ‘high’ or ‘low’ magnitude of incentive as this is likely to vary 
with the individual circumstances of participants. The magnitude of incentives described in the 
literature range widely from as little as, for example, US$5 for attendance for influenza vaccination 
(Nowalk et al., 2010) to as much as, for example, US$750 for attendance at a smoking cessation 
programme and continued cessation over 12 months (Volpp et al., 2009). Others have offered 
variable incentives based on the level of behaviour performed (Hunter, Tully, Davis, Stevenson, & 
Kee, 2013). Those with lower disposable incomes may consider smaller absolute values of incentives 
to be more ‘valuable’ than those with higher incomes. For this reason, it is possible that the 
effectiveness of any particular magnitude of financial incentive varies according to the socio-
economic circumstances of participants (White, Adams, & Heywood, 2009). It also makes intuitive 
sense that larger magnitude incentives would be more effective overall and this accords with Equity 
Theory which proposes that perceived overcompensation for a particular behaviour arouses feelings 
of guilt and compensatory action to reduce that guilt – e.g. taking part in the requested behaviour (J. 
S. Adams, 1965; Biner & Barton, 1990). Whilst there is some evidence that increasing incentive 
magnitude increases effectiveness, this has not been extensively studied in the context of health 
behaviours. Paul-Ebhohimhem & Avenell (2008) considered the value of financial incentives in terms 
of participants ‘personal disposable income’ (PDI) and reported only a weak trend for greater 
effectiveness with incentives larger than 1.2% of PDI. In contrast, Reactance Theory suggests that 
financial incentives may be perceived as a threat to individuals’ freedom of choice and that they will 
act to restore this freedom by choosing not to perform the behaviour (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). If 
perceived threat increases with incentive magnitude, a simple linear relationship between 
magnitude and incentive effect should not be expected.   
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Certainty. The ‘certainty’ domain describes how sure participants can be, from the start of 
the incentive programme, that they will receive the incentive if they successfully change their 
behaviour. We have included three dimensions of this domain.  
Certain incentives. ‘Certain’ incentives are incentives which participants will definitely 
receive if they successfully perform the health behaviour of interest. Grocery vouchers given every 
week a smoke-free breath test is provided (Ballard & Radley, 2009) are a good example of a certain 
incentive.  
Certain chance incentives. Participants will not necessarily receive ‘certain chance’ 
incentives even if they achieve the behaviour, but they can be sure from the outset what the 
likelihood of receiving the incentive is. For example, each time a weight loss target is achieved, 
individuals might be given the opportunity to draw a ticket from a bowl of 500 tickets, only half of 
which are associated with prizes (with tickets returned to the bowl after each draw) (Petry, Barry, 
Pescatello, & White, 2011).  
Uncertain chance incentives. In the case of uncertain chance incentives, participants are 
both unsure whether they will receive the reward if they achieve the behaviour, and what their 
chances of receiving it will be. Quit & Win contests are the best example of uncertain chance 
incentives (Cahill & Perera, 2011). In these contests, the chances of winning depend both on how 
many other people enter the contest and how many of these manage to quit by the end of the 
contest – neither of which can be accurately predicted from the outset. Lottery tickets given in 
exchange for behaviour change (Glasgow, Hollis, Ary, & Boles, 1993) would be also considered 
uncertain chance incentives as the recipient cannot be sure that they will win anything in the lottery, 
or what their chances of winning will be at the outset of the intervention.  
Target. The ‘target’ domain captures the difference between financial incentive 
interventions for what we term ‘process’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘outcome’ behaviours. Process 
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behaviours are those that involve engaging in a process that is likely to help individuals achieve 
healthy behaviour outcomes by providing behavioural change skills, but which are not healthy in 
themselves – for example, attending drug rehabilitation sessions (Carroll et al., 2006), or smoking 
cessation counselling (Volpp et al., 2009). Intermediate behaviours are those that could be 
considered healthy in themselves, but which are encouraged as intermediaries to other outcomes – 
for example, incentivising regular physical activity as an intermediary to achieving weight loss 
(Jeffery, Wing, Thorson, & Burton, 1998). Outcome behaviours are those representing healthy distal 
behaviours – for example, rewarding drug-free urine samples (Carroll et al., 2006). Incentives have 
also been offered for non-behavioural proxy markers of behaviour, such as weight loss (Jeffery, 
Gerber, Rosenthal, & Lindquist, 1983). 
Frequency. ‘Frequency’ describes the proportion of occurrences of the behaviour that are 
incentivised. We have categorised this domain into ‘all’ or ‘some’ instances of behaviour being 
rewarded. Some behaviours are much easier to continuously monitor, making it possible to reward 
every occasion on which the behaviour is performed (e.g. rewards based on the number of physically 
active minutes, monitored by pedometer) (Finkelstein, Brown, Brown, & Buchner, 2008). In other 
cases, on-going monitoring of every occurrence of the behaviour may be impossible or impractical. 
For example, it is probably unfeasible to reward every cigarette avoided in a smoking cessation 
incentive intervention, but a reward can be given for each smoke-free breath test (Ballard & Radley, 
2009). There is some evidence from laboratory-based work that partial reinforcement with 
incentives for some, rather than all, instances of a desired behaviour is likely to lead to more 
sustained behaviour change than rewarding every instance of the behaviour (Bitterman, 2006), but it 
is not clear if this also occurs in the community. 
Immediacy. The ‘immediacy’ domain describes how soon after the behaviour occurs that the 
incentive is provided. Too long a delay between behaviour and reward may mean that participants 
do not easily link the two and the incentive fails to act as an effective reinforcer. It is likely that there 
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is an optimum time between behaviour and incentive for changing health behaviours, and this may 
be different for different behaviours. Again, laboratory-based work suggests that variable intervals 
between behaviour and reward may be more effective than fixed intervals (Bitterman, 2006). As far 
as we are aware, this is not something that has been explored in terms of health behaviours in the 
community and this may be a fruitful avenue for future research. As immediacy is a continuous, 
rather than categorical, domain we do not provide dimensions for it in Table 1.  
Schedule. The domain of ‘schedule’ is dichotomised into those incentives that offer fixed 
magnitudes of incentives for each instance of the behaviour that is incentivised, and those that offer 
variable incentives in response to prolonged behaviour change. In most cases, varying reward 
schedules are incremental with values of rewards increasing as the number of monitoring sessions at 
which the behaviour is confirmed increases (Carroll et al., 2006). Contingency Management Theory 
predicts that gradually increasing the value of incentives as maintenance of behaviour progresses 
will lead to more sustained behaviour change and there is some evidence to support this in the 
context of cigarette abstinence (Roll, Higgins, & Badger, 1996). 
Recipient. The final domain in our framework is ‘recipient’. The majority of financial 
incentives are given to the individuals who are asked to perform incentivised behaviours. However, 
some programmes cluster participants into groups with rewards for average group performance 
(Jeffery et al., 1983). Others reward clinicians (Salize et al., 2009), significant others (Jeffery et al., 
1983), or parents (Lawrence et al., 2004; Minkovitz et al., 1999) in addition to, or instead of, the 
individuals who change their behaviour.  
Conclusion and unanswered questions 
We believe that it is possible to describe all health promoting financial incentive 
interventions according to our framework and give some examples of this in Table 2. In practice, 
many financial incentive interventions designed to change health behaviours include a number of 
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different incentive components. For example, individuals might receive a cash reward at each 
monthly check-up that they provide a smoke-free breath test, and also be entered into a lottery 
each month they are confirmed as smoke-free (Glasgow et al., 1993). In these cases, the framework 
should be used to describe all individual incentives components separately.  
The framework should also help provide a structure for future research on financial 
incentive interventions for healthy behaviours. Given the complexity of financial incentive 
interventions, the framework highlights the naivety of current research that tends to focus on simple 
questions of whether or not financial incentive interventions “work” to successfully change healthy 
behaviours. Our framework will help guide a more mature approach exploring how financial 
incentive interventions can be configured to achieve the most sustained behaviour change, and 
whether different configurations are required for different groups of individuals or behaviours. For 
example, it is not clear what the optimal configuration of each domain is for effective behaviour 
change and whether this varies across different behaviours or according to the personal, socio-
economic characteristics of participants.  
The order we have presented the domains here is arbitrary and we do not, at this point, 
have good reason to believe that any domains are more important, in terms of intervention 
effectiveness than others. Further research is required to clarify this. Furthermore, it is likely, but not 
clear, that the domains are not independent of each other. For example, whilst cash incentives have 
been reported to have higher perceived value than voucher incentives (of the same face value) of 
relatively low magnitudes (Rosado, Sigmon, Jones, & Stitzer, 2005), this difference may reduce as 
magnitude increases. Additionally, given that individuals tend to overestimate the probability of 
events with low chance occurring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), there may be an interaction 
between certainty and magnitude such that higher potential magnitude incentives (e.g. £1000) with 
low certainty (e.g. 1 in 100 chance) may be more effective than lower magnitude (e.g. £10) ones of 
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higher certainty (e.g. definite chance) – even if the absolute expected return remains the same (£10 
in both cases). 
This framework should help researchers and policy makers recognise the complexity of 
financial incentive interventions and how they can vary across a range of different domains. We do 
not believe that this complexity has been widely recognised previously and the framework helps 
both to highlight this and to provide a vocabulary to begin to explore it further.   
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Table 1: Framework of nine domains, with dimensions and examples, of financial incentives for health-behaviour change 
Domain Dimension Example 
Direction Positive reward Welfare benefits increased for confirming all immunisations are up to date in children (Lawrence et 
al., 2004) 
 Avoidance of penalty Welfare benefits decreased for failing to confirm all immunisations are up to date in children 
(Minkovitz et al., 1999) 
Form Cash Cash reward for weight loss (Jeffery et al., 1983) 
 Vouchers for range of goods/services  Grocery voucher for smoke-free breath test (Ballard & Radley, 2009) 
 Specific goods/service MP3 player for weight loss (Petry et al., 2011) 
Magnitude Continuous (not categorical) variable Total value of incentive available to participants; ideally considered in relation to individual socio-
economic circumstances 
Certainty Certain Grocery voucher for smoke-free breath test (Ballard & Radley, 2009) 
 Certain chance Chance to draw from bowl of 500 tickets, 250 of which are associated with prizes, for weight loss 
(Petry et al., 2011) 
 Uncertain chance Entered into lottery to win holiday for smoke-free breath test (Cahill & Perera, 2011) 
Target Process  Shopping vouchers for attendance at routine out-patient drug rehabilitation sessions (Carroll et al., 
2006) 
 Intermediate Cash reward for attending supervised walks to achieve weight-loss (Jeffery et al., 1998) 
 Outcome Shopping vouchers for drug-free urine (Carroll et al., 2006) 
 Proxy measures of behaviour Cash reward proportionate to weight loss (Jeffery et al., 1983) 
Frequency All instances incentivised Cash reward based on number of physically active minutes per week (Finkelstein et al., 2008) 
 Some instances incentivised Grocery voucher for smoke-free breath test, measured once per week (Ballard & Radley, 2009) 
Immediacy Continuous (not categorical) variable How soon reward is received after behaviour is performed  
Schedule Fixed Weight loss reward at a fixed rate per pound lost (or maintained as lost) per month (Relton et al., 
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2011) 
 Variable Drug users received $25 shopping vouchers for the first treatment session attended, increasing by $5 
for each additional consecutive session attended (Carroll et al., 2006) 
Recipient Individual  Cash reward proportionate to weight loss achieved by individual participant (Jeffery et al., 1983) 
 Group Cash proportionate to average weight loss in group of participants (Jeffery et al., 1983)  
 Significant other  Cash to nominated significant other for weight loss in participant (Jeffery et al., 1983) 
 Clinician Cash for each patient who quits smoking (Salize et al., 2009) 
 Parent Welfare benefits increased for confirming all childhood immunisations are up to date (Lawrence et al., 
2004) 
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Table 2: Example financial incentives for health behaviour change characterised using the framework  
Domain Example 1 – £12.50 grocery vouchers for 
pregnant smokers who give smoke-free 
breath tests at 12 weekly appointments 
(Ballard & Radley, 2009) 
Example 2 – commitment contract at 
www.stickK.com with $10 forfeited for every 
day healthy eating for weight control goal 
not met  
Example 3 - $10 cash reward for injecting 
drug/crack cocaine users who returned on 
time to have a tuberculosis skin test read 
(Malotte, Rhodes, & Mais, 1998) 
Direction Positive reward Avoidance of penalty  Positive reward 
Form Vouchers for restricted goods/services Cash Cash 
Magnitude £12.50 per week with smoke-free breath 
test, achieving a maximum possible of £150 
$10 per day of participation $10 for one-off on-time return 
Certainty Certain Certain Certain 
Target Outcome Intermediate  Outcome 
Frequency Some instances incentivised All instances incentivised All instances incentivised 
Immediacy Within 7 days of behaviour Within 24 hours of behaviour Immediately following behaviour 
Schedule Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Recipient Individual Individual  Individual 
 
 
